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CASE COMMENTS
and could not have been discovered by the vendor upon inspection.
For what the code requires is not evidence that the defects should or
could have been uncovered by the seller, but only that the goods
upon delivery were not of a merchantable quality or fit for their
particular purpose."
Even if one inclines toward the position taken by the minority
in the principal case and considers that the majority opinion does
violence to well-established principles of law in West Virginia, it
should be remembered that the case has little value as a precedent
setting decision since it deals with West Virginia law as it existed
prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. Therefore,
the principles of the case would apply only to contracts of sale
arising before July 1, 1964. The unimportance of the case in setting
precedent may in part account for the court's willingness to strain
reason and principles of law in order to arrive at what they felt to be
an equitable result.
Peter Thomas Denny
Torts-Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice
Foreign Object Left in the Patient
Action was brought by a patient against her physician to recover
damages for injuries sustained through alleged negligence of physician
in failing to remove laparotomy pad (lap pad) inserted in the
patient's abdomen during the course of surgery. The trial court held
that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was not applicable and required her
to produce expert evidence to establish D's negligence and P appealed
to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. Held, reversed and
remanded. Expert evidence is not required to establish the
physician's negligence where the patient showed (1) that while she
was in an unconscious state the physician was in complete control
of the operation and (2) the failure of physician to remove the
lap pad from her abdominal cavity before closing the wound
constitutes such a breach of duty owed to her that (3) a layman
could infer negligence without the aid of expert testimony. Under
these facts the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable. Easterling
v. Walton, 156 S.E.2d 787 (Va. 1967).
11 Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F. 2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967).
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It is often stated that negligence must be proved and will never
be presumed,1 mere proof of injury not being sufficient.2 However,
negligence, like any other fact, may be established by circumstantial
evidence.3 One aspect of circumstantial evidence is the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur which means that "the thing speaks for itself."4
Three important questions to be considered are (1) when will the
doctrine be applied; (2) what is its effect when applied; and (3) how
will it be applied to medical malpractice cases in West Virginia.
The conditions which are necessary for the application of the
doctrine are usually stated as follows: "(1) the event must be
of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's
negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
plaintiff."5
Some courts, including West Virginia, have alluded to a fourth
condition that "evidence of the true cause of the injured person's
injury is accessible to the defendant, but practically inaccessible to
the injured person."6 The better view would apparently be not to
treat this as a requirement but rather merely a factor that is frequently
present, especially in the medical malpractice cases involving patients
under anesthesia.' It would appear that if the circumstances of the
I W. PnossEa, ToRTs, § 39 at 215 (3d ed. 1964).
2 Goff v. City Lines of W. Va., 130 W. Va. 220, 223, 43 S.E.2d 800,
801 (1947); Keyser Canning Co. v. Klots Throwing Co., 94 W. Va. 346,
360, 118 S.E. 521, 526 (1923).
3 W. PRossan, supra note 1, at 216, citing 2 WIGMOIE, Evidence, § 25
(3d ed. 1940).
4 W. PsossEn, supra note 1, at 217.
- W. Pnossmi, supra note 1, at 218; citing 4 WiMons, Evidence, §
2509 (1st ed. 1905); Mecum v. Food Machinery and Chemical Corp.,
143 W. Va. 627, 638, 103 S.E.2d 897, 904 (1958); Ellis v. Henderson,
95 S.E.2d 801 (W. Va. 1957) decision recalled, 142 W. Va. 824, 828, 98
S.E.2d 719, 721 (1957); Barker v. Withers, 141 W. Va. 713, 716, 92 S.E.2d
705, 707 (1956); Jones v. Bridge Co., 70 W. Va. 374, 376, 73 S.E. 942, 943
(1912); Bice v. Wheeling Electrical Co., 62 W. Va. 685, 691, 59 S.E.
626, 628 (1907).
6 Ellis v. Henderson, 95 S.E.2d 801, 805 (W. Va. 1957) decision re-
called, 142 W. Va. 824, 98 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1957); accord, Stein v. Powell,
203 Va. 423, 426, 124 S.E.2d 889, 890 (1962); Middlesboro Coca-cola
Bottling Works, Inc. v. Campbell, 179 Va. 693, 699, 20 S.E.2d 479, 481
(1942); McCall v. U.S. 206 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va. 1962).
7 See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees 154 Cal.
App. 560, 568, 317 P.2d 170, 175 (1957). The court, in expiaining the
reasons for the application of res ipsa loquitur to medical malpractice cases
stated that "usually the patient is by reason of anesthesia or lack of medical
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case create a reasonable inference of the defendant's negligence,
then the inference should not be barred merely because defendant
shows that he knows nothing about how the injury occured.' On
the other hand, in the medical malpractice cases, and most especially
in those cases involving a foreign object left in the body of a patient,
this fourth element is usually present and raises little or no problem
since it could hardly be contended that laymen, under anethesia
had more knowledge of the situation than the surgeon.
The requirement that the injury must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff9 is
merely present to eliminate from consideration the possibility that
plaintiff was the one responsible."0 This requirement merely narrows
the scope of inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. The
West Virginia cases often refer to applying the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur when the injured person is "without fault.'"' This would not
be a problem in the case of a foreign object left in the body of a
patient.2
The requirement that the injury be caused by an instrumentality
within the control of the defendant is merely another way of stating
that negligence in the air will not do and must be brought home to
the defendant.' 3 Thus the West Virginia cases have held that the
doctrine cannot be invoked where the accident may have resulted
from causes over which defendant had no control. 4 Control should
be interpreted to raise the question whether the defendant had the
right to control, rather than whether control was actually exercised or
not. 5 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not apply when the
element of control is lacking or as stated in the West Virginia cases,
8 W. PRossER, supra note 1, at 229.
9 Authorities cited note 5 supra.
10 W. PnossEn, supra note 1, at 228.
11 Mecum v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp, 143 W. Va. 627, 638,
103 S.E.2d 897, 899 (1968); Pope v. Edward M. Rude Carrier Corp., 138
W. Va. 218, 229, 75 S.E.2d 584, 590 (1953); Wright v. Balan, 130 W. Va.
466, 473, 43 S.E.2d 364, 368 (1947).
12 In the more general malpractice case where the plaintiff is suing
because of a "bad result" and it might be contended that plaintiff did not
properly care for himself, it will be seen that res ipsa should not apply.
'3 W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 222.
14 Mabe v. Huntington Coca-cola Bottling Co. 145 W. Va. 712, 718,
116 S.E.2d 874, 878 (1960); Barker v. Withers, 141 W. Va. 713, 717, 92
S.E.2d 705, 707 (1956); Phillipi v. Farmers Mut. Tel. Co., 113 W. Va.
470, 473, 168 S.E. 762, 763 (1933).
15 W. PnossEn, supra note 1, at 224.
1968]
3
Glasser: Torts-Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1968
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
when there is "divided responsibility."'" In the principal case this
requirement was satisfied by the testimony of a nurse that the
surgeon had complete control over the operation and the persons
assisting him and as such was "captain of the ship.""' In the case
of a foreign object left in the body of a patient control should not be
a troublesome requirement.' 8
The requirement that the event be of a kind which ordinarily
does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence is the
prerequisite which causes the most difficulty in applying res ipsa
loquitur to medical malpractice cases. This requirement is necessary
in order to provide a reasonable basis on which to draw an inference
of negligence.' 9 The principle is often stated in West Virginia cases
that the doctrine is inapplicable unless the only reasonable conclusion
deductible from the circumstances is that the casualty happened
through defendant's negligence."0 The general principle in medical
malpractice actions is that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be
invoked only where a layman would be able to say as a matter of
common knowledge that the consequences of the treatment were
not what would have ordinarily followed if due care had been
exercised.' This provides the basis for the general distinction in the
cases to which res ipsa will or will not be applied. The doctrine
would generally be inapplicable in a malpractice case predicated
on the fact that the treatment was unsuccessful or there were
unfortunate results, but res ipsa is applicable when the cause of action
is based on specific negligent acts or omissions.22 In other words, the
16 Mullins v. Baker, 144 W. Va. 92, 99, 107 S.E.2d 57 62 (1959);
accord, Laurent v. United Fuel Gas Co., 101 W. Va. 199, 512 , 133 S.E.
116, 122 (1926).
'7 Easterling v. Walton, 156 S.E.2d 787, 789 (Va. 1967).
,8 This should be compared with other medical malpractice cases where
the injury occurs outside the operating room and where the surgeon does
not have control: Sherman v. Hartman, 137 Cal. App. 2d 589, 290 P.2d 894
(1955) (Blood transfusion in patient's room negligently administered by
nurse-res ipsa held not applicable); Blackman v. Zelids, 90 Ohio App.
304, 103 N.E.2d 13 (1951) (res ipsa loquitur held not applicable to de-
fendant-physician for negligence of hospital employees in preparing plaintiff
for operation).
'9 W. PRossFn, supra note 1, at 218; Note, The Use of Expert Evidence
in Res Ipsa Loquitur Cases, 106 PENN. L. REv. 731 (1958).
20 Ellis v. Henderson, 95 S.E.2d 801, 804 (W. Va. 1957) decision re-
called, 142 W. Va. 824, 828, 98 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1957); Barker v. Withers,
141 W. Va. 713, 716, 92 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1956); Crotty v. Virginian Ry.,
115 W. Va. 558, 563, 177 S.E. 609, 611 (1935).
21 Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1262, 1274 (1962).
22 Annot., 162 A.L.R. 1265, 1267 (1946). This distinction is made
and pertinent cases are discussed.
[Vol. 70
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doctrine should clearly apply to a situation such as the principal
case in which a foreign object was left in the body of a patient,
because by the very nature of the omission laymen are able to infer
that due care was not exercised. 3
It is also the general rule that res ipsa loquitur may be invoked only
where a layman, as a matter of common knowledge, can say that the
consequences of the doctor's treatment would not have occurred if due
care had been exercised.24 Thus res ipsa forms an exception to the
general requirement that expert evidence is necessary to support an
action for negligence against a physician or surgeon. 5 This
requirement of expert testimony is based on the idea that juries of
laymen are "normally incompetent to pass judgment on questions
of medical science or technique."26 Since the doctrine of res ipsa
is correctly applied to those cases where laymen as a matter of
common knowledge can infer that due case was not exercised, the
two theories are perfectly consistent. The final result is that
"expert testimony is a prerequisite in a malpractice case except
where it can be said that a 'thing speaks for itself'. 27
The great majority of American courts treat res ipsa loquitur as
merely a form of circumstantial evidence that leaves the inference
to be drawn to the jury.28 The statement is often found in the cases
that the application of res ipsa raises a presumption of negligence,
but it appears that these cases are being overruled today.29 The
better view would appear to be that by the application of res ipsa
the plaintiff has sufficient evidence to go to the jury but he still has
the burden of proof.3" This burden is not shifted to the defendant,
23 Annot., 162 A.L.R. 1265, 1299 (1946); Note, Use of Expert Evidence
in Res Ipsa Loquitur Cases, 106 PENN. L. lEv. 731, 731 (1958).
24 Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1262, 1274 (1962).
2' Annot., 141 A.L.R. 5, (1942); Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 597 (1962).
26 W. PRossER, supra note 1, section 32 at 167.
27 60 MIcH. L. REv. 1153, 1162 (1962). The article also states that
some courts create an added difficulty, in cases where laymen cannot deter-
mine if the accident would have occured if due care had been exercised, by
stating that res ipsa does not apply because there is no expert testimony.
Other authorities have advanced the view that expert evidence might be
introduced by either party to give a foundation, or to demonstrate the lack
thereof, for application of res ipsa where a layman cannot say whether the
thing speaks for itself or not. Note, The Use of Expert Evidence in Res
Ipsa Loquitur, 106 PENN. L. lEv. 731, 735 (1958). For cases where this
has been applied see Id., 736-738.
28 W. Psossan, supra note 1, at 233; Annot., 53 A.L.R. 1494 (1928);
Annot.', 167 A.L.R. 658 (1947).
29 W. Paossnm, supra note 1, at 235.
30 Id. at 233.
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except in the non-procedural sense that if he fails to rebut the
inference the jury may very well find against him." The language
that is most often used and which was also cited in the principal
case is the following: ". . . [R]es ipsa loquitur means that the facts
of the occurrence warrant the inference of negligence, not that they
compel such an inference . . . that they call for explanation or
rebuttal, not necessarily that they require it ....
Although there has been frequent reference throughout this
comment to res ipsa cases in West Virginia, none of these cases were
medical malpractice cases. West Virginia is in substantial accord with
the general requirements and ramifications of the res ipsa doctrine
However, research has disclosed only one West Virginia medical
malpractice case which -considered the doctrine and there it was
rejected. The case, Vaughan v. Memorial Hospital,33 was one in
which the doctrine in the better view3" would not apply. The cause of
action was founded almost entirely upon the result which followed the
treatment and the basic question was concerned with a doctor's
choice of methods in setting a broken leg."5 The court stated, on the
basis of policy reasons that will be discussed below, that res ipsa
would not apply.36 Defendant was awarded a new trial and when
the same case again came before the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals the court stated that: "The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does
not apply. The negligence of a surgeon is ascertained by pointing
to something he should have done or did do which was not in accord
with reasonable care and diligence ... and is not ascertained by the
results. 37 The general rule in medical malpractice cases in West
Virginia is that negligence or want of professional skill must be
proved by expert witnesses.3" This rule has been modified to
permit negligence to be established by lay witnesses in cases where
there is such a want of skill as to dispense with the need for expert
31 Id.
32 Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 240 (1913). The West Virginia
cases are in agreement, e.g., Halley v. Purity Baking Co. 128 W. Va. 531,
537, 37 S.E.2d 729, 732 (1946); Wright v. Valan, 130 W. Va. 466, 476, 43
S.E.2d 364, 370 (1947).
33 100 W. Va. 290, 130 S.E. 481 (1925).
14 See text at note 22 supra.
35 Vaughan v. Memorial Hospital, 100 W. Va. 290, 130 S.E. 481 (1925).
36 Id. at 294, 130 S.E. at 482. Discussed in text at note 44.
37 Vaughan v. Memorial Hospital, 103 W. Va. 156, 163, 136 S.E. 837,
840 (1927).
38 Roberts v. Gale, 149 W. Va. 166, 172, 139 S.E.2d 272, 276 (1964);
Schroeder v. Adkins, 149 W. Va. 400, 410, 141 S.E.2d 352, 358 (1965);
Buskirk v. Bucklew, 115 W. Va. 424, 425, 176 S.E. 603 (1934).
[Vol. 70
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 3 [1968], Art. 26
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol70/iss3/26
CASE COMMENTS
testimony. 9 However, this is not the same as res ipsa loquitur. Res
ipsa does not require the showing of what actually occurred. In fact
if all the circumstances and facts appear in evidence, there is
nothing left to infer and the doctrine is inapplicable.4" With the use
of res ipsa plaintiff does not need to show what occurred or that
what occurred was negligent. The West Virginia exception to the
requirement of expert testimony to establish negligence means that
the plaintiff still must show what occurred but does not need an
expert to testify that the standard of care was breached."
Therefore the question that must be asked is whether, given a
suitable case, the courts of West Virginia would go one step further
and approve the use of res ipsa loquitur in a medical malpractice case.
This question has not been presented to the West Virginia court, at
least not in a suitable case, and the reason is probably due to a
statute of limitations problem that has since been cured. When a
surgical instrument or pad has been left inside the patient's body,
it is unlikely that the patient will discover the injury for some time.
There will probably be a period of believing that the soreness and
discomfort is normal from an operation, and then a longer period
before the plaintiff finally finds the injury. The initial position of
the West Virginia court was that the cause of action for malpractice
accrued at the time of the operation and relief was barred where the
action was not brought within one year.42 This view was not
overruled until 1965 when it was held that the statute of limitations
did not commence to run until plaintiff learned or by the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have learned of the injury.4" This decision
39 Roberts v. Gale, 149 W. Va. 166, 172, 139 S.E.2d 272, 276 (1964);
Buskirk v. Bucklew, 115 W. Va. 424, 425, 176 S.E. 603 (1934).
40 Newark Ins. Co. v. Davis, 139 F. Supp. 396, 399 (S.D.W. Va. 1956).
41 This can best be illustrated by contrasting the two types of cases.
In Howell v. Biggart, 108 W. Va. 560, 152 S.E. 323 (1930), the doctor
continued to administer a drug which was producing obviously harmful
results on the patient. The patient's evidence dearly established the mode
of treatment. In Buskirk v. Bucklew, 115 W. Va. 424, 176 S.E. 603 (1934),
the defendant-doctor continued to administer x-ray treatment until the
patient was so severely burned as to be unable to work. Again plaintiff's
evidence established what occurred.
The above cases should be contrasted with those where the doctrine
of res ipsa was dearly applicable, e.g., Jefferson v. U.S., 77 F. Supp. 706,
aff'd, 178 F.2d 208 (D.C. Md. 1948) where although recovery was denied
on other grounds the court stated that the evidence showed that the towel
was from plaintiff's operation and this justified the inference that what
occurred was negligent. Easterling v. Walton, 156 S.E.2d 787 (Va. 1967);
Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal. 2d 82, 64 P.2d 409 (1937); Tiller v. Von Poble, 72
Ariz. 11, 230 P.2d 213 (1951).
42 Gray v. Wright, 142 W. Va. 490, 500, 96 S.E.2d 671, 676 (1957).
41 Morgan v. Grace Hospital, 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965).
1968]
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will permit the question of the use of res ipsa loquitur in a suitable
medical malpractice case to be squarely presented to the court.
The court's answer will depend on the basic policy considerations
before it. It appears that opposition to the use of res ipsa loquitur
in a medical malpractice case is often based on a misconception of
its effect. Cases that refuse the application of the doctrine "4 almost
invariably use language similar to that in a West Virginia case "
discussed above:
A physician is not a warrantor of cures. If the maxim res ipsa
loquitur were applicable . . . and a failure to cure were held
to be evidence, however slight, of negligence on the part of the
physician or surgeon causing the bad result few would be
courageous enough to practice the healing art, for they would
have to assume financial liability for nearly all the ills that the
flesh is heir to.46
The problem with the quoted language is that a case founded on a
bad result is exactly the type of case to which res ipsa should not
apply.4" Another reason that is often advanced for not applying the
doctrine to malpractice cases is that plaintiffs rarely lose res ipsa
cases, except where the defendant's explanation is very convincing
which is relatively rare occurrence.48 But it appears that this state-
ment, if it is true, is a result of the type of case to which res ipsa
will apply and is not a result of the doctrine.
On the other hand there are weighty arguments advanced for
acceptance of the doctrine. First, although admittedly expert evidence
would be preferable it is often unavailable due to the "conspiracy
of silence."49 It has also been advanced that res ipsa should be
applied because the patient is under anesthesia or without medical
knowledge," ° and therefore knowledge of the facts is peculiarly
11 For a comprehensive listing of cases where res ipsa was held not
applicable see, Annot., 162 A.L.R. 1265, 1269 (1946); Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d
1262, 1277 (1962).
41 Vaughan v. Hospital, 100 W. Va. 290, 294, 130 S.E. 481, 482 (1925).
46 Id. at 294 (emphasis added). The court is quoting from Ewing v.
Goode, 78 Fed. 442 (1897).
47 See text at note 22 supra.
48 2 HA"E'R AN JAmEs, The Law of Torts § 19.11, 1099 (1956).
49 Comment, 60 Micii. L. REv. 1155 (1962); W. Pnossim, supra note
1, at 167, citing a number of cases; Salgo v. Leland Standford Jr. Univ. lcI.
of Trustees, 154 Cal. A p. 2d 560, 568, 317 P.2d 170, 175 (1957), (giving
a discussion of the problems involved).
11 Salgo v. Leland Standford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App.
2d 560, 568, 317 P.2d 170, 175 (1957).
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within the possession of the doctor.' Still another argument for the
application of the doctrine is that plaintiff should not be barred
from the doctrine merely because he is suing a doctor rather than
a bottle or airplane manufacturer.5 2 In this regard perhaps a state-
ment that appeared in a 1934 article in the West Virginia Law
Quarterly is both apropos and conclusive:
As the practice of medicine in its various branches tends to
become a business rather than a personal relation ... when the
medical profession laid aside as outmoded and unsanitary the
shawl of the family doctor . . . and assume the efficient white
jacket of specialization and commercialism, it likewise lost the
armor of infallibility that the shawl concealed. 3
Martin J. Glasser
Wills-Contingent
T died of natural causes. He left a holographic will while prefaced
dispositive provisions with the clauses "In event that I get killed..."
and "In case of accident.. ." The Chancery Court refused to admit
the will to probate on the basis that the operation of the will was
contingent upon T's being killed or dying in an accident. Held,
affirmed and remanded. The language employed in the will was
clearly conditional upon the death by accident or violent means,
and death having occurred due to natural causes, the attempted
testamentary disposition became inoperative and void, and was
properly denied for probate. In re Estate of Martin, 199 So.2d 829
(Miss. 1967).
The principal case is one of a long line of cases in which the
courts have been presented with the problem of determining whether
the operation of a particular holographic will was contingent on the
occurrence of a specified event or whether the will was absolute and
intended to be operative in any event. The decision in the principal
case appears to be a very sound and justifiable one. However, it
appears to be rather difficult to reconcile this decision with West
Virginia decisions dealing with the same issue. Thus, it is of value to
51 60 MIcH. L. REv. 1153, 1154 (1962).
52 Id. at 1155.
53 Posten, The Law of Medical Malpractice in West Virginia, 41 W. VA.
L. Q. 35 (1934).
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